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The secularization debate involves a lengthy time horizon and competing predictions over mankind's cultural future (Swatos and Olson 2000) . Each party possesses its cherished 'master narratives': taken-for-granted outlooks regarding where we have come from and where we are going, which can structure interpretations of data (Taylor 2007: 427-8; ). In addition, the immense complexity of the terms 'religion' and 'secularization' and their symbiotic historical and etymological relationship problematize the issue (Casanova 1994) . Notwithstanding these difficulties, at the most basic level, there exist competing visions concerning the relative trajectory of distinct 'secular' and 'religious' populations. With so much at stake, it is surprising that two major aspects of religious change in Europe have generally been overlooked: first, shifts in the rate (rather than merely the direction) of religious change; second, the population dynamics of religious change, i.e. demography. Demography is especially important for narratives of change, because it is the most predictable of the social sciences. One can use population age and sex structures, as well as migration patterns and fertility and mortality trends to make reasonable predictions about the future religious character of a population.
If we assume that people's current religious preferences are unrelated to their previous views or those of their parents, and that people change their religiosity as they might a pair of clothes, then we may safely disregard demographic analysis. However, given that this is manifestly not the case, demographic approaches to the study of religion's rise or decline are essential. Moreover, demographic projections of religious composition become feasible -not as definitive predictions, but to reveal how the macro trend of religious growth or decline is affected by demographic factors and current switching patterns. In this paper, we use cohort component projections of Austria, Switzerland and 2 Spain to help inform the empirical picture deployed by secularization theorists and their adversaries.
Trends in religious conversion and apostasy in the 'native' European-origin population vary markedly between countries in Europe, and these social changes lie behind most of the variation in rates of religious decline between European countries (Greely 2002; Davie 1994; Halman and Draulans 2006) . This study builds upon these observations, adding that rates of change can shift over time within societies as well as between them. In particular, it finds that rates of socially-driven religious decline seem to be most rapid when societies first undergo 'secularization' (in Steve Bruce's 2002 formulation) but tend to taper off in subsequent periods.
This paper also adds a demographic dimension, which it argues will become progressively more consequential for the European religious panorama in the twenty-first century. Demography is shaped by cultural and economic forces, but once 'birthed', population dynamics acquire a causal power which can reshape the social. The most important of these new demographic factors are religious fertility and religious immigration. 1 First of all, the growing importance of values in determining family size (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004) means that religious native-stock European women have significantly higher fertility than their 'secular' counterparts. Second, current patterns of immigration, coupled with differences in age structure and fertility between those of European and non-European descent as well as lower losses through conversion to other religions and secularism, are radically reshaping the region. Already, non-Europeans have changed the face of western Europe, especially the cities. Their numbers will triple 3 by 2050, and, towards the end of our century, those of unmixed European ancestry may be in the minority (Coleman and Scherbov 2005; Coleman 2006 Coleman , 2009 Coleman , 2010 .
Importantly, these non-European immigrants tend to be more religious -typically Muslims or Christians -than their host populations (Phalet 2010) . The limited evidence for second generation minority populations suggests that religious decline will occur more slowly (if at all) among them than it has among the majority population. In short, scholars can no longer juxtapose the religious exceptionalism of minorities with the secular European mainstream when minorities become mainstream. These interlocking trends -decelerating rates of net exit from religion, religious immigration and religious fertility -may signal a modest rebound of religion in western Europe by the mid-twenty first century.
The Secularization Debate
The term secularization is a contested concept, first used by Christian commentators in their discussion of secular time, which some suggest is reflective of a peculiar pattern of western theological modernization (Casanova 1994) . Others aver that the term is a useful descriptor of reality and possesses two dimensions, one public (i.e.
institutional relations between religion and the state) and one private (i.e. personal piety, whether in the form of beliefs, practice or affiliation). This study is concerned with the latter, but rather than enter into the wider debate over secularization, this paper narrows its focus to the less loaded question of religious decline. Consider, for example, the European trend of growing post-Christian, individualized spirituality among the young and well-educated. These individuals reject spiritual authority and conventional religious 4 categories (including 'god') but also spurn rationalistic atheism and embrace an immanent form of belief (Houtman and Aupers 2007; Taylor 2007: 507-16 ). For us, this represents religious decline, but its relationship to secularization remains ambiguous.
On both sides of the debate, there is wide agreement that religiosity can rise and fall over time. Secularization theorists claim that human development, social differentiation, expressive individualism and cultural relativism lead to religious decline in modern societies (Bell 1996 (Bell [1976 Dobbelaere 2000; Bellah [1985 Bellah [ ] 1996 . Revivals are driven by human insecurity or 'secular' movements like ethno-nationalism and regionalism which use religious symbols and institutions to mobilize people (Bruce 2002; Martin [1978 Martin [ ] 1993 . Advocates of the supply-side perspective maintain that religious decline is a feature of societies with a poorly developed religious marketplace. In particular, those with an established religion tend to spawn a lax religious establishment which fails to cater to the wide spectrum of religious demand latent in a population.
Revivals are linked to new religious innovators who tap unmet spiritual demands (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000: 57-79 (Davie 1994 (Davie , 2002 . This work builds on these nuanced studies of religious trends in western Europe by highlighting variations in attendance and belief both between and within particular countries. However, this paper remains agnostic as to whether these patterns are best explained by secularization or religious markets perspectives.
Demographic Aspects of Religion
Much of the research on the sociology of religion has focused on religion as a social phenomenon whose rise or decline depends upon the conscious choices of individuals within changing structural contexts. However, it is apparent that even in the absence of socially-inspired revivals/declines of religion, the degree of religiosity in a society can fluctuate. The chief non-social mechanism of change is demography. If we consider 'the religious' as a population affected not only by assimilation/dissimilation into 6 the secular population but by migration, fertility and mortality, we arrive at a more multivalent picture. David Voas is one sociologist who has urged that greater attention be paid to the use of demographic methods in the study of religion. 'People enter, exit, and move within religion,' he remarks, 'just as they are born, will die, and migrate, in life' (Voas 2003: 94) . For Michael Hout, 'demography helps shape the religious landscape…
The combination of differing demography and stable intergenerational religious socialization would be sufficient to equalize or even reverse the relative sizes of the religions.' (Hout 2003: 79-80 (Sherkat 2001 (Sherkat : 1472 . Conservative
Protestants, a much larger group than the Mormons, also benefit from relatively high fertility. Hout, Greeley and Wilde (2001) find that three-quarters of the growth of conservative Protestant denominations against their liberal counterparts is due to fertility advantage rather than conversion.
In Europe, there has been less attention paid to fertility differences between denominations. However, several studies have discovered that immigrants to Europe tend to be more religious than the host population and -especially if Muslim -tend to retain their religiosity (van Tubergen 2006) . Though some indicators point to modest religious decline toward the host society mean, other trends suggest that immigrants become more, rather than less, religious the longer they reside in the host society (van Tubergen 2007).
All of which indicates that religious decline may fail at the aggregate level even if it is occurring at the individual level (Kaufmann 2006; . This article thereby investigates the hypothesis that a combination of higher religious fertility, immigration and slowing rates of religious apostasy will eventually produce a reversal in the decline of the religious population of western Europe.
Data and Methods
In order to test this hypothesis, this paper draws upon data from several sources.
These include the EVS of 1981, 1990, [1999] [2000] 2008 The study is limited to ten west European countries, with roughly 1000 cases per country in a given year. Countries included are Spain, Belgium, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Sweden. These countries were selected because they are the only cases that were sampled across all waves of the EVS and ESS on the research questions of interest. This therefore maximizes the number of countries and cases within the constraint of repeated measures over time. 2 Rather than weighting each country sample by its population, they have been aggregated in additive fashion to prevent larger countries skewing the results.
Though these countries only represent a sample of European nations, we believe they broadly represent 'western European' (i.e. all but eastern Europe) trends. To situate the dataset in a European context, one can examine the same ten countries using data from the World Christian Database (WCD), aggregate them the same way, and see how their combined degree of nonreligiosity -this time measured in terms of no religious affiliation -compares with Europe as a whole. 3 The comparison is not perfect, of course, since our terms of reference are not identical. The WCD works with aggregated baptismal data, which gives a good measure of affiliation, while we are more interested in attendance and subjective measures of religious belief, which come from the EVS, ESS and minority surveys. 4 That said, the comparison with WCD agnosticism data in figure 1 9 does help reassure us that this sample, labeled '10 dataset' in figure 1, is not exceptional within western Europe.
[ Figure 1 Evidently the sample used in this analysis, which blends cases fairly evenly from the WCD regions of northern, western and southern Europe, is well within the bounds of the four regional European trends, though lying closest to the northern European pattern.
Results
Has religious decline occurred in these ten countries? Most contemporary analyses examine aggregate trends over time or inter-cohort trends at one point in time Notice that there is a pronounced pattern of declining religious attendance as we move from left to right, from the earliest to the most recent birth cohorts.
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In addition, attendance is declining with each survey so the most recent lines are below the older ones, apart from a jump in the 2000 EVS which may be a period effect.
Also evident is the lack of any life-cycle pattern whereby respondents return to worship as they get older: the five wave lines do not shift upwards in chronological order with 1981 at the bottom and 2008 at the top. This appears to confirm the findings of secularization theory, which argues that religious attendance falls across generations and does not revive as one ages through the life course.
[ Figure 2 here] Source: EVS 1981 EVS , 1990 EVS , 1999 EVS -2000 EVS , 2008 . In essence, the EVS religion question, which exhibits inter-cohort decline, does not seem to be tapping a generalized spirituality.
Is this proof of west European religious decline? Yes and no. True, the trend is toward decline across generations. Yet there are some interesting divergences from the attendance patterns in figure 2 . First, the data on self-assessed religiosity support the life cycle hypothesis that individuals become more religious as they age. This is an interesting departure from the secularization position, and contrasts with the pattern we The picture is different for private religiosity: inter-cohort declines are sharp in both early and late secularizing societies, but the return to religiosity across the life cycle appears to be considerably stronger among those in early secularizing countries to the extent that life-cycle effects broadly counterbalance cohort effects.
It would appear that in the ten west European societies we have examined, levels of religiosity appear to be approaching a baseline of around 5 percent church attendance 40-50 percent private religiosity. Moreover, it is worth noting that while individual religiosity stands as one of the strongest of all religious indicators on the EVS, it is exceeded by some 10 points by belief in god. to be neither belonging nor believing.
Religiosity and Fertility
The patterns of religiosity detailed in the preceding analysis could have been produced by either demographic or social forces, but the swift pace of religious decline in the postwar period its distinctively age-graded profile incline us toward a sociological interpretation. The fact that the rate of religious decline has slowed in these west European societies may, however, offer an opening for demography to more significantly affect the religious composition of west Europe's population. These numbers are somewhat skewed, however, since religious respondents tend to be older and are thereby more likely to come from more fertile cohorts and have completed their fertility than the nonreligious. But even when controlling for age, survey year, birth cohort, sex, education and income, table 1 shows that religious women in these ten countries still enjoy a significant fertility advantage over nonreligious women. 9 This is very much in line with the existing literature.
[ Table 1 Here]
A further finding in the literature is that women are less likely to leave organised religion . These data confirm that this holds as well for religious attitudes. 
Projections of Religious Change in Western Europe
It is possible to undertake cohort-component demographic projections of religious belief based on EVS data (models available upon request) but belief is arguably a less concrete category than affiliation (Skirbekk, Kaufmann and Goujon 2010) . In addition, we cannot derive immigrants' and minorities' age structure data based on religious belief, so projections which integrate sociological switching, religious fertility and immigration are more difficult. However, it is possible to shed some light on what Europe's religious future may look like by using affiliation data, as this is asked on four west European censuses (Austria, Switzerland, Britain, Ireland) and contains sufficient sample sizes to 19 generalize about immigrants and minorities. Here we present findings for Austria and Switzerland as, unlike the other cases, it is possible to determine religion raised, and hence to adduce switching patterns.
We apply cohort component methodology to projecting affiliation in Austria and
Switzerland as per the methodology and sources in (Goujon, Skirbekk et. al 2006; Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2007 ). 14 Though not among the ten countries whose trends we analyzed above, the west European location of these two countries places them squarely within the purview of the trends examined in this paper.
Projections
Our projections use the censuses to derive a total fertility rate for women of all major religious affiliations, including those who state that they have no religion (see table   2 ). Note that even in these two low-fertility countries, the nonreligious have significantly fewer children than others while Muslim fertility rates, though modest, are well above the national average and over twice as high as the nonreligious rates.
[ We also build in immigration estimates drawing on immigrant source-country religious demography (from CIA World Fact Book), and incorporate Austrian and Swiss religious statistical yearbook data on religious switching for all 5-year age bands of each religion.
A standard mortality schedule is used for all groups.
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Selected results from these integrated projections are presented in figure 5 . We limit the scope to nonreligious and Muslim populations to spotlight the difference between the largely sociologically-driven increase of the nonreligious group and the demographically-driven rise of the Muslim population. Two projected nonreligious population scenarios are displayed, the 'expected' projection based on existing (fast) rates of net switching to nonreligion, and a 'low decline' projection which assumes that net rates of religious apostasy slow to zero by 2026-31 at which point the flows between religion and nonreligion are deemed to neutralize each other for the remainder of the projection period.
[ Figure Any exercise in projection is partly dependent on its assumptions -though much less so than other social sciences given the demographic momentum locked into age structures. Some inputs are more predictable than others. For instance, given the existing literature, the results of the multivariate analysis in table 1, and the statistics on generational fertility patterns in the first four figures, it would be surprising if secular and religious fertility rates converge.
Assuming that fertility differentials between the religious and non-religious in western Europe remain as they have for cohorts throughout the twentieth century, our 22 projections show how age and fertility structures can alter the direction of future religious change. Apostasy scenarios may vary more, but again, it is difficult to discern a return to higher rates of disaffiliation in the least religious countries of western Europe on the basis of a sustained post-1945 generational trend, sampled over a 30-year span. In short, an acceleration in religious apostasy rates appears as unlikely as a major religious revival.
Should surveys show the religious population remaining stable in the early-declining countries in the next decade or two, longer-term religious growth will become increasingly likely.
Immigration, both Muslim and Christian, may also vary, though it is worth mentioning that the general trend over the past two decades has been toward higher than 
Conclusion 23
This essay has tried to address some of the shortfalls in the current literature on religious decline in Europe which have been caused by an insufficient consideration of a) changes in the rate of religious change; and b) the demographic dynamics of religion.
Most participants in this debate tend to frame their arguments in the form of either secularization or supply-side theory, both rooted in unidirectional sociologies of religion.
Neither rates of change nor demographic forces are considered.
In the ten west European societies sampled, we find evidence of generational decline in both participation and belief. However, this is skewed by Catholic societies like Ireland and Spain, where religiosity is high and religious decline is proceeding rapidly. By contrast, in France and the mainly Protestant countries, religious decline took hold much earlier and the marginal propensity to leave among the religious remnant is lower than it was in decades past. These less religious northwestern European societies have reached a level of 'maturity' in their religious decline. Weekly religious attendance has troughed at around five percent of the total, but the proportion of the population expressing religious beliefs remains close to 50 percent, suggesting a 'believing without belonging' dynamic among a large segment of the population (Davie 1994 ).
In the absence of sizeable shifts in a society's weltanschauung toward religiosity or secularism, the oft-neglected demographic dimension takes over. Differences in the age and sex structure of religious and secular base populations and secular-religious fertility differentials and sex ratios play a role, but exert an impact only in the very long run. By contrast, non-European immigration and religious retention -especially among Muslims -makes a strong and rapid impact. Set against these currents is the younger age structure of the nonreligious population stock and the relative youth of new religious 24 apostates. Those who leave at younger ages will not return to the pews, but many will return to belief.
Demographic projections based on belief are difficult, but projections of affiliation -for countries where this is possible -provide a proxy, and they reveal that the demographic momentum of previous generations of religious decline will take three or four decades to pass. This will keep the religious share of the population on a gently declining trend for several decades. Thereafter, aggregate religious revival will begin to escalate unless people once again begin to leave religion at the rapid rates recorded during the mid-twentieth century.
This is not the end of religious decline, which will continue with vigour in
Catholic Europe, as it may in the United States (Hout and Fischer 2002) . A more assertive European anti-clerical atheism combined with the demise of multiculturalism could raise the cost of remaining religious. Moreover, other trajectories are possible.
Major geopolitical changes could ease tension between Muslims and other Europeans;
liberalizing theological shifts could pave the way for an increase in the rate of Muslim apostasy. Immigration could become ethnically controlled, as in Japan or Singapore, due to a surge of ethnic nationalism, thereby slowing the demographic growth of religion. A new vogue for family life might narrow the fertility gap between the secular and the religious. These changes would set European religious decline back on its formerly robust course.
However, in the absence of such changes, the steady-state outlook for western
Europe by the mid twenty-first century is one of gradual, long-term reversal, probably around 2050. The dramatic impact of immigration and Muslim religious retention will 25 bring this process forward -even in Catholic countries -such that we may begin to see 'de-secularization' in western Europe in the coming decades. Indeed, this is already visible in the continent's religiously-vibrant immigration cities. We acknowledge that further research, using alternative datasets and methodologies, is required to confirm where the balance in Europe lies between religious decline through switching and religious growth through population change. In particular, scholars should pay attention not only to the valence of religious change but to shifts in rates of religious change.
The idea that religious decline among individuals can coexist with a modest rise in religiosity at the national level is a distinct possibility. All of which suggests that both altered rates of religious change and demography need to be more fully incorporated into the dominant secularization and religious markets paradigms.
